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The Role of Communication in Global Civil Society: Forces, Processes, Prospects
EDWARD COMOR 
Abstract
The author examines the concept of global civil society (GCS) through the use of 
theoretical tools and empirical evidence related to the study of International 
Communication. He demonstrates that scholarship on GCS tends to simplify the 
process through which information becomes knowledge and that the state system-GCS 
relationship often is presented in terms of an ahistorical power dichotomy. In relation to 
these problems, what the author calls "GCS progressives" tend to underplay political-
economic factors shaping GCS, including the implications of structural power; they tend 
to emphasize the importance of spatial integration while neglecting related changes in 
temporal norms; and, more essentially, they often under-theorize the importance of 
socialization processes and relatively unmediated relationships in the ongoing 
construction of "reality." The author concludes that through a more focused analysis-
concentrating on how new technologies can be used to organize nationally and locally, 
and on lifestyle changes associated with communications developments-more precise 
analyses and fruitful strategies for GCS progressives may emerge.
The concept of global civil society (GCS) involves some extraordinary claims Through 
emerging forms of transnational associational life, a new political, economic, and 
cultural order is said to be under construction. The agents of these developments are a 
"medley of boundary-eclipsing actors-social movements interest groups, indigenous 
peoples, cultural groups, and global citizens" (Pasha and Blaney, 1998:418). 
Structurally, new interactive communications technologies are providing groups and 
individuals with unprecedented capacities to form meaningful transnational networks. 
These, in turn, have the potential to circumscribe status quo (state system-based) ways 
of relating and thinking. The formation of some kind of global civil society, most probably 
modeled after liberal-democratic ideals and liberal-market economies, thus may well be 
the outcome of the turbulent post-Cold War era (Rosenau, 1994).
In this article, such claims regarding the potential formation of a global civil society are 
assessed through concepts and empirical issues related to the subject of 
communication. There are two reasons for this focus. One involves the status of 
communication in the analyses of GCS theorists. For a global civil society to emerge, 
transnational intersections of culture, meaning, and identity are required; and these 
entail the shared development and sustained implementation of a range of 
technological, organizational, and institutional media. A central pillar in this grand 
conceptualization is the recent growth (if not explosion) of electronic forms of 
transnational communications. Relatively new applications in telecommunications and 
computers, exemplified by the Internet and e-mail, are thought to be essential. Together, 
such developments are lauded as the means through which a prospective revolution in 
the exchange of information, consciousness, and, thus, world order is being made 
possible.
The other reason for my focus on communication involves the epistemological 
assumptions entailed in a communication-based perspective. In keeping with the views 
of GCS theorists, such a perspective assumes that the standards of rational thought, 
and even reality itself, are historically conditioned. As such, it is reason- able to 
postulate that changing conceptions of what is "real" and "unreal" or "imaginable" and 
"unimaginable" can facilitate (or retard) efforts to reconstitute world order. It is with this 
in mind that a communication-based approach is an appropriate perspective from which 
to assess the extraordinary claims related to the concept of GCS. Simply put, a 
communication-based approach shares significant components of the epistemological 
framework used by global civil society theorists. As a result, the theoretical and 
empirical tools it brings to the debate facilitate a critique of the GCS literature in the 
context of the latter's own fundamental assumptions rather than through some kind of 
external and potentially hostile mode of intellectual engagement.
Communication, in sum, lies at the core of GCS prognostications-in terms of the 
opportunities associated with new technologies and in terms of its general assumptions 
regarding how communication is related to consciousness, identity, and conceptions of 
reality. However, as I demonstrate in what follows, the writings of GCS theorists contain 
significant weaknesses in relation to both. In an effort to draw attention to these, and to 
suggest alternative ways of understanding issues related to communication-related 
developments, this article is organized into four sections. The first examines an 
essential component of GCS claims-that more transnational information is generating 
more transnational ways of "knowing" and that these emerging global realities 
themselves signal the potential formation of a more organized and potentially 
progressive trans- national politics. In reviewing the work of what may be referred to as 
"GCS progressives," I find these claims to be questionable, most fundamentally 
because they are based on a rather dubious notion of how information is related to 
knowledge.
The second section builds on the first by assessing the role of new technologies in the 
annihilation of temporal and spatial barriers and the implications of this development in 
the potential reformulation of identity. Here I argue that GCS theorists are typically naive 
in their assumptions regarding the potentials of such developments to significantly 
modify how people identify and conceptualize themselves. As demonstrated in this 
section, the ascendancy of transnational communications itself does not necessarily 
stimulate the kind of progressive global community anticipated by many GCS theorists. 
Instead, relatively mediated forms of communication (and the conceptual mediations 
applied in the process of "knowing") are playing an indirect role in reshaping community 
and identity through, most importantly, their influence on changing lifestyles. Also in this 
section, the tendency among GCS theorists to make extrapolations from particular case 
studies is redressed, in part, by recognizing that the development of new and 
entrenched "global" ways of knowing are, to say the least, varied and extraordinarily 
problematic.
The third section examines the treatment of both the inter-state system and
the state in the GCS literature. It demonstrates how GCS progressives tend to
convey an ahistorical understanding of state-civil society and state system-global
civil society relations. The most egregious problem that emerges from this is
the concept of GCS can tell us remarkably little on issues related to global power
structures and disparities. The implications of this point then are pursued through a brief 
discussion of how GCS theorists tend to be uninterested or misinformed
on issues concerning the political economy of transnational communication 
developments.
In the final section-the article's conclusion-further consideration is given to some of the 
key points made in previous sections and these are related in what is admittedly a 
pessimistic evaluation of GCS potentials in the new century. In light of this critique and 
evaluation, I end with some thoughts on how to explain the apparently rising status of 
global civil society as a conceptual category despite its many and significant limitations.
Information and Knowledge
Arguably, the most remarkable aspect of GCS theorizations is the primacy of 
transnational arrangements and global identities in relation to states. Emerging 
transnational networks are thought to be compelling new ways of thinking that 
increasingly are divorced from territorially or nationally defined boundaries. The 
subsequent demand for rights among the occupants of various configurations of 
community, it is assumed, will lead to the wrestling away from states of many of their 
sovereign powers (Shaw, 1996:56-57). Of course this is not to say that the agents of 
GCS can ever be completely autonomous of states.1 At the very least, individuals, 
groups, organizations, and institutions rely on states to regulate essential aspects of 
local, national, and international life.
In its most tangible form, GCS can be viewed as a transnational community in which 
legal norms, codes of conduct, social mores, and so forth transcend and
stand above the sovereign authority of individual states. A global citizenship based on 
"globalization from above," in which we see the "identity of elites arising from the 
integration of capital," and a "globalization from below," involving "a growth of human 
solidarity arising from an extension of democratic principles," constitute the polar 
extremes of what appears possible (Falk, 1993:40). For GCS progressives, however, 
global civil society holds at least the potential to universalize, and make politically 
accountable, basic standards of human rights, environmental protection, and other such 
demands. Through an emerging consciousness characterized by nascent global 
communities and, hence, global identities, a relatively more peaceful world may even be 
on the horizon.
Proponents of this perspective attach great importance to the transformative potentials 
of transnational communications. Information, and the process of its exchange, is 
thought to be inherently affecting. But implicit in this thinking is an overly simplistic 
understanding of the relationship of information with knowledge- the relationship of what 
is communicated with what is known. GCS theorists, for the most part, tend to treat 
information and knowledge as if they are one and the same. Emerging transnational 
associations, facilitated by eroding technological and cultural barriers, involving a broad 
range of people exchanging information, are seen to be the bases of nothing short of a 
transformation of consciousness into "global" ways of knowing (Brecher et al., 1993:xv-
xvii).
The Internet, for example, is perhaps the core technology through which information will 
transform the ways in which people understand both the world and their identities in it. 
Because the Internet enables people to exchange information instantaneously and at 
relatively low cost, more people will share and be exposed to more information. More 
precisely, this belief that significant improvements in electronic communications lead to 
improvements in the lot of humanity involves the assumption that, according to Nancy 
Stefanik, "all the world's residents [will] learn from each other" (Stefanik, 1993:264). Or, 
as Howard Frederick asserts, the "decentralizing and democratizing qualities of new 
computer technologies" will facilitate the development of a "global movement for the 
common good" in which people may "rise above personal, even national, self-interest 
and aspire to common good solutions to problems that plague the entire 
planet" (Frederick, 1993:286).
A more guarded optimism-avoiding this kind of borderline technological determinism-
can, of course, be found in the work of several GCS theorists. Richard Falk, for one, 
presents a more balanced approach. For him, the Inter- net, for example, is being used 
by a range of interests, including actors representing the aspirations of transnational 
corporations. Rather than endorsing the Internet as a tool for democracy, corporations 
instead generally use such new technologies to promote a disciplined and flexible 
workforce as well as new and loyal consumers. Nevertheless, the Internet also 
constitutes a medium of potential emancipation. In the hands of progressive activists, 
Falk also believes that the "worldwide web allows for an empowerment of globalization-
from-below in a manner that seems presently difficult to subdue or ignore" (Falk, 
1999:6).
Falk's general point is correct. From the much cited Zapatista movement in Mexico, to 
the less well known resistance efforts of the James Bay Cree Indians in northern 
Quebec, to the networking of a range of interests leading to the anti-WTO protests in 
Seattle in 1999, many examples can be cited to illustrate the utilization of new 
technologies in support of a broad range of progressive activities (Whitaker, 
1999:166-168). But although the Internet, e-mail, and other such technologies have 
largely annihilated the spatial and temporal barriers of electronic forms of 
communication, the assumption that these breakthroughs also are facilitating a 
historically significant qualitative transformation in how people think clearly requires 
more investigation. As Sydney Tarrow points out, in the absence of long-term data, it is 
too early to embrace the Internet, for instance, as a medium through which the 
collective consciousness of progressives will be disseminated and adopted globally 
(Tarrow, 1998:193-194).
At its extreme, the position taken by many GCS progressives constitutes a throwback to 
the classical empiricists who argued that people understand their lives and worlds as a 
result of what they accumulate through the use of their senses. For Bacon, Locke, and 
others, human beings acquire knowledge through their innate information-absorbing 
capabilities. There are significant problems with this position. For one thing, it generally 
renders us unable to explain the ability to understand information in the absence of 
relevant experience. Indeed, the problem facing empiricists in conceptualizing the 
relationship between information and knowledge can be summed up in the difficulties 
they have answering the following question: if what is known is dependent on what 
information already has been absorbed, how can new information (i.e., a new 
experience) be interpreted "reasonably"? The answer to this has become a key 
component in subsequent efforts to explain how we come to know what we know 
(Levinson, 1988).
To understand how we make sense of information without some previous
exposure to relevant data or experience-while also rejecting the tautology that we know 
what we know because, in essence, we already know it-it has been
proposed that people learn to interpret information in particular ways. Rather than 
understanding the mind to be some kind of information-absorbing sponge, instead, 
people learn how to select and process information into knowledge. As developed
in this article, the empiricist tendencies in the work of many GCS progressives
generally lead to a neglect of the historical and structural contexts in which
people do precisely this. In sum, the ways in which we select and process information 
into what is known (i.e., what is "reality") is not innate-it is socially conditioned.
This conceptualization of the relationship between information and knowledge is a core 
philosophical building block in the interdisciplinary area of social science called the 
sociology of knowledge (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). One its fundamental postulates 
is that reality is neither God-given nor simply a product of what is observed in the 
material world. What we know, instead, is a complex and varied outcome of "our own 
eyes, a mixture of us and the outside world, and in a sense a reflection of 
ourselves" (Levinson, 1988:71). From this perspective, the assumption in much of the 
literature on GCS that information directly shapes what its receiver knows is shown to 
be seductively simplistic. A related assumption, that the quantity of these exchanges 
roughly corresponds to a growing sense of understanding and community, constitutes a 
large and rather sloppy leap of logic.
What is missing in many accounts of GCS are assessments of precisely how 
information modifies interpersonal and intercultural understandings, identities, and 
realities that go beyond the assumptions held by the classical empiricists. To take this 
point one step further, the very logic used to prognosticate a cosmopolitan and even 
progressive GCS, essentially, is the same as that used in anticipation of a far more 
disturbing future. The concept of cultural imperialism, for example, brought into 
prominence through the political activism of mostly Third World governments calling for 
a "New World Information and Communication Order" beginning at the end of the 
1960s, involved similar assumptions (MacBride, 1984). In the literature associated with 
this movement, telecommunications satellites and other developments involving 
information technologies and trans- national communications were directly associated 
with the interests of giant corporations and their Northern nation-state benefactors 
(Schiller, 1992). Given the interests and structural conditions shaping the 
implementation and use of these technologies, it was assumed that more information 
crossing borders would lead to a world characterized by ever-growing consumer 
appetites, pro-free market ideologies, and, ultimately, a consent-based form of American 
hegemony (Becker et al., 1986).
This perspective remains an important framework for several students of the political 
economy of communication (Mosco, 1996). For them, the opening up of national 
borders for commercial interests is viewed as a contributing factor in the relative 
commercialization of the public sphere and the ascendancy of neo-liberal regulatory 
regimes. Private corporations and states who accommodate or promote their interests 
are chiefly responsible for encouraging quite the opposite of the cosmopolitan global 
citizen envisioned by GCS progressives. Instead, these forces will stimulate the 
predominance of a critical and perhaps anti-intellectual thinking. Even the Internet, 
because of the dominance of private sector interests in its development, is far more 
likely to promote a global consumer society than some kind of harmonious global civil 
society (Schiller, 1993). Unlike the ideals of GCS progressives, a global consumerist 
society (a quite different kind of "GCS") instead may be emerging, characterized by 
individualistic interests and the pre- dominance of materialistic pursuits.
Again, like the optimism in the writings of many GCS proponents, a central problem that 
emerges in this "critical" position lies in the formula that information is knowledge. 
Simply put, people are not intellectual sponges. The information we receive-whether it is 
an advertisement promising happiness through consumption or an e-mail from an NGO 
compatriot involved in a human rights campaign-does not always (and straightforwardly) 
become an ingrained part of one's own "reality." In response, GCS theorists might argue 
that this comparison is inappropriate. After all, the interactive qualities of new 
communications technologies facilitate a circumvention of status quo mass media and 
its messages. Unlike, for example, the transnational direct broadcast satellite systems 
that were being planned in the 1970s, the Internet-based technologies of the twenty-first 
century enable people to be directly involved in constructing their global identities. In 
other words, new technologies facilitate globalization "from below" because, for the first 
time, people, rather than states or corporations, control the flow and exchange of 
information.
But again, this way of looking at things too readily equates information with knowledge, 
and far more analytical rigor is needed before we can embrace such rosy predictions. If 
GCS (or any civil society) involves the development and maintenance of a deep sense 
of involvement and identity with others through an exchange of electronic forms of 
information, a careful consideration of the specific processes involved is required. This, I 
believe, can be done, first, by recognizing that as individuals are socialized, they 
develop what have been called "conceptual systems" (Comor, 1998a:25-28). These are 
what people use to process information into knowledge (i.e., what is understood to be 
reality). At any particular moment, one's senses are deluged with information and from 
the moment of birth we are involved in the task of learning how to manage it. What is 
relevant and new must be sorted out from what is seemingly irrelevant and routine. In
this way, human beings learn to cope with the incalculable number of sights, sounds, 
odors, tastes, and textures that inundate us. The alternative to this socialization 
process-this process of learning how to process information-would be madness (Berger 
and Luckmann, 1967).
To communicate anything, from a simple desire to a complex message, those involved 
must share similar references and associations or must, at the very least, have some 
preexisting familiarity with what is being conveyed. If, however, people do not share a 
language, cultural references, and so forth, information may be conveyed but little (if 
any) of it will be understood (Hall, 1959). As we are socialized, our conceptual systems 
become both entrenched and more complex. As we learn to mediate and interpret 
information in our particular cultures and relevant subcultures, we also learn to sort out 
what information is "good" and what information is "bad," what is "rational" and 
"irrational," "realistic" and "unrealistic." As such, all information is mediated into what we 
know using learned, intersubjective, and implicitly power-laden conceptual systems.
One GCS theorist who has escaped the limitations of empiricism is Ronnie
Lipschutz. In his support of the argument made by James Rosenau - that world 
populations are becoming more analytically astute and thus politically capable 
(Rosenau, 1994)-Lipschutz writes:
It is not the contact [i.e., the communication of information] itself but the ability to 
use data as knowledge that is the critical element-data are the electronic bits 
transmitted by communication systems; knowledge involves having the skills to 
use the data toward specific ends. The relevant skills have been spread, perhaps 
unwittingly, by the growth of post-secondary educational institutions around the 
world, as well as by changes in the world economy. Because political systems are 
so diverse, the particular channels of articulation of this new competence vary from 
one country to the next. However, the general effect is one of the creation of 
networks of global political activity in parallel to the state system. (Lipschutz, 
1996:114-115; emphasis in original)
Lipschutz elsewhere goes beyond this focus on "skills" and acknowledges the role of 
culture and local experience in shaping how people come to understand their world.3 In 
his writing on changes in the meaning of nature, for instance, Lipschutz recognizes that 
what "whale" or "forest" means to someone whose livelihood is directly related to them 
usually will differ from the interpretations of people brought up and working in other 
contexts. Lipschutz goes on to argue that these infrastructures need not determine how 
people interpret information (Lipschutz with Mayer, 1996:60-62). Larger or external 
cultural forces can intervene "via various channels of information" and can, he says, 
modify "the meaning of self in relation to place" (Lipschutz with Mayer, 1996:63). 
Lipschutz theorizes the information-to-knowledge process in terms of what he calls 
"social learning" and, borrowing from Haas, argues that the processing of information 
involves socially learned "understandings about cause-and-effect linkages" (Haas, in 
Lipschutz with Mayer, 1996:65).
Beyond this instrumentalism (informed by the assumption that people process 
information in accordance with their perceived interests), Lipschutz understands human 
knowledge to be both more complex and varied:
Every human society has its own system of beliefs (myths, norms, rules), social 
relations, and production practices that form a single, more-or-less coherent 
framework.... Within each one's framework, these beliefs, relations, and prac- tices 
must operate in a regular fashion if the overall fabric of the society is to remain 
intact and be reproduced over time. (Lipschutz with Mayer, 1996:68)
Human beings thus do not process information into what is known in necessarily 
"rational" or instrumental ways. Instead, our mediating conceptual systems
are shaped by lifestyles, work experiences, customs, language, mythologies-by
cultures. In the contemporary era of globalization involving instantaneous trans-
national communications, however, Lipschutz believes that such personal and
local biases are being increasingly "influenced by knowledge and practices originating 
elsewhere" (Lipschutz with Mayer, 1996:72). A continuous struggle between
the global and the local is under way and this, he says, is due in part to the relevance 
and resilience of local cultures.
Lipschutz thinks that what we know is ultimately a process of the mind and thus what 
shapes this process is essential in efforts to assess the transformative implications of 
communications. He concludes that, as a result of globalization and related 
communication and transportation developments, new forms of collective identity are 
emerging (Lipschutz, 1996:117-118). Lipschutz also believes that, ultimately, 
transnational networks of knowledge and practice will transcend significant aspects of 
the state system (Lipschutz with Mayer, 1996:74).
Martin Shaw also is optimistic about a prospective GCS. Like Lipschutz, Shaw's 
prognostications are based on a kind of dialectical analysis. But perhaps more so than 
Lipschutz, Shaw bases his optimism on what may be described as a more functionalist 
argument. While the complex and often contradictory dynamics of globalization will, for 
Shaw, generate environmental, cultural, and economic crises, "it is through such crises 
that we can increasingly identify global society and the development of its 
institutions" (Shaw, 1994:4). Through, for instance, the "global coordination of 
communications ... ideas and values ... become increasingly commonly held" (Shaw, 
1994:11). Conflict in this emerging configuration of shared realities is the precondition to 
an eventual integration of people sharing common global interests. Indeed, the 
conflictual aspects of diversity, where cultural differentiation is linked to political conflict, 
can be seen under the rubric of global integration. Conflict sharpens awareness of 
mutual dependence and promotes the development of common responses and 
institutions for regulation, which in turn involve cultures of cooperation. (Shaw, 1994:13)
Unlike Lipschutz, but like many GCS progressives, Shaw substantiates his optimism by 
relying on what is essentially an empiricist notion of how information is processed into 
knowledge. A growing awareness of global injustice and environ- mental degradation, 
forged mostly through nonstate communication networks, somehow will lead to a 
shared sense of global responsibility. But again, to assess such claims, we need to 
examine more than just what information is being exchanged, who is involved, and how 
its communication is taking place. We also need to carefully assess those factors 
conditioning conceptual systems in this period of globalization and, more precisely, the 
role of transnational, national, and local communication in relation to this conditioning.
Before proceeding, a few words regarding Falk's recent book, Predatory Globalization, 
is warranted in relation to these conditioning factors (Falk, 1999). As mentioned above, 
the optimism expressed by Falk is tempered by his awareness that any progressive 
transformation will entail a political struggle against vested interests possessing 
significant resources. Indeed, those seeking a "people- oriented" form of globalization 
are largely limited to "guiding [the] ideas" that underlie how globalization is being 
structured-a development, for the most part, being driven by corporate-based interests 
(Falk, 1999:140-141).
Of course, as Falk himself recognizes, there are specific exceptions to this general 
tendency. RonaldJ. Deibert, for one, has investigated the use of the Internet
to enable transnational lobbying networks opposing the Multilateral Agreement
on Investments (Deibert, 2000). Richard Price, similarly, on the subject of inter-
national security norms related to landmines, has documented the process in which 
Internet-based networks have facilitated the kinds of communities and
discourses needed to modify (or, using his term, re-socialize) state policies (Price, 
1998). But these examples-praiseworthy as they are-and the many other studies 
emphasizing the importance of such networks in support of progressive interests are in 
and of themselves not my concern here. Instead, what I am arguing is that the 
ahistorical and dichotomous treatment of civil society-state relations, the generalizations 
made as a result of this conceptual starting point, and the general absence of structural 
power concerns in much of the GCS literature are all too commonplace. More generally, 
as elaborated below, the inherent idealism of such studies involves a questionable 
understanding of the relationship between ideas and material conditions. Despite the 
apparent analytical sophistication of Lipschutz, Shaw, and Falk, for example, all under-
theorize qualitative aspects of how information is processed into knowledge. As such, 
political potentials and strategic options are subjected to gross miscalculations.
Time, Space, and Conceptual Systems
The prognostications of GCS progressives and those who, instead, anticipate some 
form of globalization "from above" entail assumptions regarding the annihilation of 
temporal and spatial barriers. With their removal through new technologies human 
beings, it is assumed, can develop identities that are as affiliated with "t global" as with 
"the national" or even "the local." Shared information and mostly mediated "virtual" 
experiences will generate conceptual systems that are relatively inclusive and 
cosmopolitan. Information involving environmental crises, human rights abuses, 
economic disparity, and other issues will be interpreted more and more in terms of the 
global commonweal than the problems of distant "others One of the most influential 
theorists shaping these perspectives is Anthony Giddens (see, e.g., the use of Giddens 
in Shaw, 1994). According to Giddens, globalization is an extension of modernization. It 
involves what he refers to as the process of time-space distinction. Through the use of 
new technologies, conceptions of time and space are becoming increasingly removed 
from the here-and-now. It is in this sense that social relations are being established and 
maintained in ways that are removed from local contexts (Giddens, 1990). As Giddens 
summarizes, 
we live "in the world" in a different sense from previous eras of history. Everyone 
still continues to live a local life, and the constraints of the body ensure that all 
individuals, at every moment, are contextually situated in time and space. Yet the 
transformation of place, and the intrusion of distance into local activities, combined 
with the centrality of mediated experience, radically change what "the world" 
actually is. (Giddens, 1991:187)
Like all forms of knowledge, conceptions of time and space, while always related to the 
here-and-now, are understood through the mediation of conceptual systems. In the 
absence of the capacity to process information into ways of knowing that accommodate 
global identities, any form of global citizenship-and its implications-would be impossible. 
How then can we evaluate the probable effects and wide-scale use of contemporary 
time-space annihilating communications technologies on conceptual systems? Although 
there cannot be a universally applicable answer to this, I think it is safe to say that while 
the information gathered through various transnational media may have some effect in 
modifying conceptual systems (as developed below), the information garnered through 
early-life socialization and day-to-day experience warrant existential priority (Tomlinson, 
1996).
At one level, this distinction between the effects of here-and-now vs. long- distance 
communication can be simplified in terms of the direct vs. indirect (i.e., relatively 
mediated) qualities of each. Of course there is no such thing as a human relationship 
that is unmediated. At the very least, some form of language or, more basically still, 
some shared meaning is required (such as a common under- standing of what is 
indicated by a facial expression or hand gesture). Socialization, cultural context, and, of 
course, conceptual systems always are employed in the mediation and subsequent 
construction of reality. Most importantly, different relationships are qualitatively different 
and a distinction should be made between those involving communications that are 
relatively direct and those involving communications that are relatively indirect. At the 
core of this difference lies the relative (but not absolute) importance of face-to-face 
relationships in the formation and shaping of conceptual systems.
The essential roles played by what sociologists call our "significant others" during 
infancy forever impress upon us the need for some amount of intimacy in our more 
meaningful relationships. This usually involves some time in the physical proximity of 
another and this intimacy can be sustained, at least temporarily, even if the other person 
moves far away from direct physical contact (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). The 
accumulation, over time, of relatively direct relationships and experiences constitutes 
the bases of our ever-mediating conceptual systems and, eventually, our identities. This 
is not to say that hours of television watching, book reading, and Internet surfing do not 
have varied and sometimes significant effects on conceptual systems (as most students 
of cultural imperial- ism, for example, would assert). Nor is it to say that Giddens and 
GCS progressives are entirely wrong in their claims about the transformative 
implications of time-space distanciation. Instead, I am arguing that our more mediated 
relationships are relatively limited in their potential to directly shape one's sense of 
identity and interpretations of reality. It is with this in mind that the ascendancy of 
transnational communications itself does not-and under present political-economic 
conditions (as discussed later) cannot-directly stimulate the kind of progressive global 
community anticipated by most GCS theorists. Instead, relatively mediated forms of 
communication are playing an indirect role in reshaping community and identity by, most 
importantly, influencing lifestyles.
Transnational communications and a range of other developments associated
with globalization are having an impact on how we live our lives from day to day.
An awareness of how others live undoubtedly opens conceptual doors and these
have facilitated (but have not in themselves determined) the formulation of innumerable 
cultural hybrids. But there are, of course, material limits to such lifestyle possibilities. As 
John Tomlinson observes, "such lifestyle choices are made within an experiential 
context that remains, in important ways, stubbornly local" (Tomlinson, 1996:75). Simply 
put, local relationships tend to prescribe the context through which global influences are 
potentially adopted and understood and transnational communications can, over time, 
modify this context by influencing changes in lifestyle that, in turn, affect conceptual 
systems.
The importance of changing lifestyles is not completely ignored in the GCS literature. 
For example, transnational communications have been associated with a growing 
awareness of those (mostly indigenous people's) lifestyles that appear to be in some 
state of harmony with the natural environment. Lipschutz, for instance, argues that even 
in a community that depends on the exploitation of the environment for its livelihood, an 
awareness of other lifestyles can challenge long-standing practices. This, however, 
involves more than the straightforward reception of information and its adoption into 
personal knowledge. Modifications in "everyday worldviews and practices" also are 
involved (Lipschutz with Mayer, 1996:64). This emphasis on awareness facilitating 
changes in lifestyles that then modify conceptual systems, from an analytical 
perspective, is far more palatable and useful than the notion of information itself directly 
reshaping consciousness.
At the risk of being labeled an "essentialist," how we live is relatively more affecting than 
what we read, see, or hear in shaping the conceptual systems used to process 
information into what is known. In relation to this, information from afar can and does 
affect how people live their lives and, indeed, the gathering of such information and 
interaction with others around the world through new technologies may constitute a 
significant aspect of one's life. But having said this, the conceptual systems through 
which information is processed into knowledge are themselves most directly the 
expressions of "ways of life" that are inescapably rooted in personal history and material 
realities (Harding, 1998:150). As such, the act of doing more work or spending more 
leisure time or engaging in more politics online-in communicating with others across 
spatial and temporal barriers-is affecting insofar as it involves changing lifestyles. GCS 
progressives who recognize that the taking on of an activist lifestyle itself both reflects 
and can revise an individual's conceptual systems thus make a most salient point. As 
Paul Wapner argues in relation to the efforts of transnational environmental activist 
groups, their role in organizing participatory forms of local politics "can alter the way 
people interact with each other and their environment" (Wapner, 1995:336). As such, 
and like most forms of participatory democracy, some modification in how one thinks is 
often a consequence of one's actions.
In recognizing that what we "know" involves a process of complex mediations, and that 
socialization and lifestyle are most influential in conditioning the conceptual systems 
employed in the task of interpreting information, this and the preceding section have 
sought to provide what is now generally lacking in the GCS literature: the sociological 
and communication-based concepts needed to assess its more ambitious claims.6 
Following this section's focus on lifestyle, the next assesses the role of structural power 
in shaping those communications developments that may influence how people live 
from day to day. It also critiques a tendency in the GCS literature to portray the state 
system-global civil society relationship as ahistorical and dichotomous. These points are 
tabled to emphasize the importance of assessing GCS in light of the context and 
consequences of a global capitalist political economy. Developments involving trans- 
national communications technologies and their complex cultural implications 
subsequently are assessed with this structural context in mind.
GCS, the State, and Structural Power
I begin this section by reiterating aspects of the argument made by Pasha and Blaney in 
their aptly titled evaluation of GCS, "Elusive Paradise" (Pasha and Blaney, 1998). In it, 
they argue that while both GCS developments and the discourse related to it are part 
and parcel of the globalization of economic and social relations, these relations are 
rarely conceptualized in the context of "the unequal and alienated relationships of 
capitalism" (Pasha and Blaney, 1998:419). Moreover, proponents of GCS tend to see it 
as an almost autonomous process, removed and in opposition to the state system. 
Martin Shaw, for example, views GCS developments as a response to the failings of 
states. According to Shaw, a struggle is under way "between the instincts of statesmen 
to maintain the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, and the pressure from 
global civil society to transcend them" (Shaw, 1996:58). Richard Falk conceptualizes 
globalization to be taking place in opposition to the state system. "Territorial 
sovereignty," according to Falk, "is being diminished on a spectrum of issues in such a 
serious manner as to subvert the capacity of states to control and protect the internal 
life of society, and non-state actors hold an increasing proportion of power and influence 
in the shaping of world order" (Falk, 1997:125).
Given this orientation, the state system-GCS dichotomy clearly is in need of some 
contextualization. The very notion that the political characteristics and capacities of any 
form of civil society are comprehensible in the absence of some developed notion of 
structural power is itself remarkable, and this is especially the case given the 
importance of the day-to-day in shaping conceptual systems. By structural power, 
generally I am referring to "the power to decide how things shall be done, the power to 
shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to 
corporate enterprises" (Strange, 1988:25).
Left to itself, notably in the context of capitalist social-economic relations, ideals of legal 
equality often stand alongside profound economic inequalities. While states, in some 
instances, enforce these inequalities, state structures also may be modified and/or 
mobilized (usually as a result of sustained and organized pressure and/or political-
economic crisis) to implement policies aimed at reform. The important point here is that 
economic injustice is not simply the outcome of state involvement in the marketplace. 
Instead, both the state and civil society exist and develop in the historical context of 
capitalism. The democratic or undemocratic conditions perpetuated by either the state 
or civil society (if such clear distinctions are possible) cannot be understood without 
some comprehension of the dynamics entailed in this complex relationship.
In a predominantly and increasingly liberal-capitalist global political economy, 
acceptable behavior (and indeed the norms often required to achieve economic success 
and status) includes such things as competitiveness, hard work, and conspicuous 
consumption. As these cultural characteristics become norms, they are, for the most 
part, de-politicized (Pasha and Blaney, 1998:423), becoming, over time, ingrained within 
conceptual systems. It is with this in mind that a more grounded (i.e., less idealist) 
assessment of the power dynamics characterizing prospective GCS developments may 
be developed.
Along these lines, the role played by capitalism constitutes an integral part of the 
discussion. Historically, prior to the ascendancy of the capitalist mode of production in 
Europe, political sovereignty--the sovereignty of the feudal lord- was directly and 
explicitly implicated in the process of surplus extraction. As such, political inequalities 
were formalized as legal and even cultural norms. For economic production and social 
reproduction to take place in feudal and most other precapitalist societies, political 
power was exercised through relatively unmediated structures. Capitalism, in contrast, 
is characterized by more complex, relatively mediated power relations.
Following Justin Rosenberg's rich historical treatment of the development of the state 
system in the context of emerging capitalist social-economic relations (Rosenberg, 
1994), we would do well to avoid defining sovereignty in terms of the practical ability of 
the state to command the behavior of its citizens relative to nonstate or extraterritorial 
agents. Nor should state sovereignty be viewed as simply some kind of residual legal 
authority. Instead, it is far more useful to define sovereignty as the social form of the 
state in a society where political power is divided between public and private spheres. In 
so doing, we are compelled to recognize the complex relationship of state-civil society 
relations directly alongside structural power. This historically situated definition also 
provides relief to the shallowness and distorting effects of debates concerning the 
contemporary state and its "strength" or "weakness" in the face of globalization, whether 
its authority is "strong" or "weak," and so forth (Rosenberg, 1994:129).
As noted previously, many GCS theorists point to the interactive and potentially 
universal qualities of new communications technologies, enabling groups and 
individuals to form their own meaningful networks thereby circumscribing status quo 
(including state system) conceptualizations of reality. At one level, this general 
perspective underplays the ongoing role of states in setting and regulating the 
parameters of what communications technologies are made available and to whom.7 
Furthermore, efforts to promote communications technologies and information-based 
products and services have been mostly led by large-scale commercial interests rather 
than by NGOs, indigenous peoples, or the working class and, for the most part, have 
unfolded in the structural context of mostly marketplace-based dynamics. The 
widespread adoption of "personalized" technologies, for example, arguably both 
constitutes a reflection of predominant market system realities (in which we are, above 
all, self-serving, ever-consuming individuals) and perpetuates these characteristics 
through day-to-day practices. Rather than being used to liberate individuals from status 
quo communications, for most-particularly those lacking either the knowledge, time, or 
incomes needed to escape the embrace of large-scale service providers (the AOL Time- 
Warner behemoth being only one of the most recent)-such technologies may well 
deepen existing dependencies and, more essentially, be used in efforts to entrench 
already pervasive conceptual systems.
The Internet, for example, is fast becoming a transnational interactive marketplace of 
mostly sensual come-ons and commercial opportunities-a far cry from its promise to 
become a truly democratic forum for the exchange of information. Of course this latter 
use is still with us and is unlikely to vanish. But given the rate of its commercialization 
and the persistent (if not growing) dis- parities in world income and technological 
capacity, the predominance of capitalist political-economic structures and dynamics 
points to the very opposite cultural developments of those anticipated by GCS 
progressives. Not only is the experience of relating to others in cyberspace qualitatively 
different from meeting others in a coffee shop, pub, or union hall, "when information 
becomes increasingly thought of and treated as little more than a commodity, national 
and international laws and regulations tend to treat publics as consumers rather than as 
citizens" (Comor, 1998b:228).
In relation to the structural power of capital, the optimism of most GCS progressives 
should be tempered for yet another reason. Contemporary developments in 
transnational communications are being led and increasingly dominated by private 
sector interests whose profit-making priorities are most influential in determining both 
who will use new technologies and what they will be used for (Golding, 1998). As a 
result, the people most likely to participate in noncommercial transnational 
communications are the relatively wealthy and educated. Simply put, poverty constitutes 
the most obvious barrier in efforts to communicate (let alone fundamentally reshape 
conceptual systems) over space and time. The cost of a personal computer to a 
Bangladeshi, for instance, represents eight years of that country's average income. 
Moreover, and related to this poverty, the basic literacy capabilities needed to actively 
participate (including a working knowledge of English) remains underdeveloped in most 
parts of the world (United Nations Development Programme, 1999:62).
In much of the GCS literature, transnational communications technologies are 
welcomed as core media through which a vast array of interests and voices will be 
expressed and organized. But even in the absence of commercial structures and liberal-
marketplace conceptual systems, generally speaking, the multitude of interests taking 
advantage of new technologies may have limited capacities in their efforts to involve 
mass audiences for sustained periods of time. Such sustained dialogues are probably 
needed if significant modifications in lifestyles and, subsequently, conceptual systems 
are to take place. As Robert Fortner writes,
Discourse is not increased by such a system. It is channeled and is specialized: it 
is not enabled, but enfeebled. People are empowered to preach, but only to their 
own choirs.... The excess of information has the effect of reducing social inclusion 
even as it increases interest-based communion. (Fortner, 1995:139)
Putting aside the emphasis on ever-changing and fashionable issues among those 
commercial interests using new technologies to secure consumers, the kinds of 
information exchanges foreseen by GCS progressives are unlikely to take place on 
anything approaching the global or temporal scales envisioned. Concerns over the 
disparate availability of communications technologies as conveyed, for instance, by 
some international organizations (ranging from the United Nations to the World Bank) 
are secondary to the actual potentials these technologies have in influencing how 
people conceptualize themselves, their realities, and thus what is "imaginable" and 
"unimaginable." Given both the political economy of their development-explicitly and 
implicitly promoting certain standards of behavior and thought-and the secondary status 
of relatively mediated forms of communication in shaping conceptual systems, the 
prospects for a progressive GCS forged through, as Falk puts it, some kind of 
"globalization from below," appear to be depressingly remote.9
Historically, one might well ask if the apparently limited powers held by citizens in any 
given liberal democracy have been the outcome of limited information and 
communication resources or have they, more fundamentally, been the result of more 
complex and structurally entrenched inequities? While such inequities obviously have 
involved disparate information and communication capabilities, they are almost 
certainly, and more directly, ongoing products of disparate capacities involving 
resources such as wealth, force, and knowledge (the latter, again, being quite different 
from "information"). In light of structural power and those aspects of it influencing the 
construction of knowledge, a GCS driven forward by a progressive global citizenry 
clearly would involve a revolutionary re-casting of conceptual systems-conceptual 
systems that are more firmly rooted in the soils of tangible-local political economies than 
virtual-global relationships.
Beyond the false state system-GCS dichotomy lies a form of structural power that 
shapes both the character of communication-based developments and, in relation to 
these, the potentials for new imaginings. The context of capitalism structurally embraces 
people as consumers, not citizens. While one cannot refute the many cases in which 
new technologies have been used to empower people, they also remain instruments of 
power for the status quo. Through the commercialization of more and more of our daily 
life (Gill, 1995), not to mention the vast extension of surveillance capabilities made 
available through the Internet and other technologies (Whitaker, 1999), a society or 
GCS characterized by hierarchies of wealth, force, and knowledge, far from being a 
sphere of democratic empowerment, more probably is the very site most in need of 
fundamental reform (Pasha and Blaney, 1998:423).
For the most part, historical and macro-level conceptualizations of power
generally, have been shelved by GCS progressives in favor of the micro-physics of
interest group struggles and questions related to identity. In their analysis of
transnational networks, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, for example, counter the 
focus on inter-state relations in mainstream International Relations by instead 
examining "dense webs of interactions and interrelations among citizens of different 
states which both reflect and help sustain shared values, beliefs and projects." As such, 
power in this world is viewed as "the composite o thousands of decisions which could 
have been decided otherwise" (Keck and Sikkink, 1998:213). Beyond the general 
absence of structural power, this and related approaches simplify the dialectical nature 
of identity and society. Because conceptual systems are used to process information 
into knowledge, human beings are not simply "free" to pick and choose preferred 
versions of reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:174-183).
Assumptions that "the self" essentially is the outcome of the rational or autonomous 
selections made by individuals from an expanding spectrum of global information 
sources are themselves shaping further assumptions about the implications of new 
technologies. What has been called the emerging "hypermedia environment" (Deibert, 
1997), for instance, involves the absolute and relative growth of personalized and 
interactive information portals, the rapid growth of transnational communication 
networks, and a deepening awareness of "the global" as a shared spatial reality. But 
then to go on to argue that such developments likely will facilitate a progressive GCS-
involving conceptual systems somehow reconstructed through virtual rather than 
material realities; involving the assumption that the structural power of capitalism will be 
lessened instead of enhanced; involving the assertion that human identities are ripe for 
some kind of revolutionary transformation-is itself a dubious proposition.
Such a transformation instead will require, first, a change in both practice and lifestyles. 
Day-to-day life (most essentially at the local level) will have to be restructured in ways 
that will encourage socialization processes quite different from those that are largely 
focused on facilitating capitalist accumulation and representative (rather than direct) 
forms of democracy. What has been called the global-local dialectic (Lash and Urry, 
1994) will no doubt accelerate and intensify. Locally, this likely will continue to involve 
various degrees of indigenization in which different cultures incorporate different 
elements of foreign cultures in different ways. However, given the context of structural 
power and the wealth, force, and knowledge resources held by some in relation to 
others, it appears unlikely that many such interactions will take place on anything 
approaching some kind of equal exchange. Indeed, such disparities could well generate 
conflict rather than cooperation. As Arjun Appadurai writes,
Globalization involves the use of a variety of instruments of homogenization 
(armaments, advertising techniques, language hegemonies, clothing styles and 
the like), which are absorbed into local political and cultural economies, only to be 
repatriated as heterogeneous dialogues of national sovereignty, free enter- prise, 
fundamentalism, etc., in which the state plays an increasingly delicate role: too 
much openness to global flows and the nation-state is threatened with revolt- the 
China syndrome; too little, and the state exits the international stage, as Burma, 
Albania, and North Korea, in various ways, have done. (Appadurai, 1990:307)
Similarly, David Harvey has argued that the annihilation of spatial and temporal barriers 
is more likely to generate competitive and perhaps even reactionary forms of localism 
and nationalism than some kind of McLuhanesque "global village." The reason, again, 
involves the historically entrenched structures of capitalism. In a world characterized by 
rapid change, free-flowing capital, and falling spatial-temporal barriers, concerted efforts 
to make "the local" comparatively attractive for investors, or to portray its culture as 
relatively (and chauvinistically) ideal, tend to become more rather than less likely 
(Harvey, 1990:271- 272). Moreover, in an increasingly interconnected world, 
characterized by rapid change and instability, and given the place-based conditions of 
day-to-day human existence, one's identification with a place most probably will remain 
an important psychological mooring. In the context of structural power and economic 
globalization, however, in this clinging to some kind of place-bound identity, 
"oppositional movements become a part of the very fragmentation which mobile 
capitalism and flexible accumulation" feed upon (Harvey, 1990:303).
I close this section with some thoughts in response to how GCS progressives tend to 
assess the implications of instantaneous communications. Generally speaking, the 
advantages of spatial reach have been emphasized but duration has been largely 
neglected. The new technologies associated with globalization are structurally oriented 
to shrink the time frames of decision-making. Whether such decisions involve the 
bombing of an enemy, the security of one's investments, the options one has in the 
workplace, and so forth, the Internet, the general commoditization of culture, and the 
related values placed on speed and efficiency arguably have set the stage for volatility 
and deepening political, economic, and cultural crises. As transnational investors 
respond to market "signals" with spasmodic acts of panic selling, as consumers fail to 
keep up with the demands of producers to buy more commodities more often, as the 
environ- mental crisis reaches a point of no return, and as people around the world 
become increasingly concerned with the here-and-now, the cultural capacity to appraise 
problems in terms of a relatively balanced consideration of both space and time appears 
to be in decline (Innis, 1982:61-91).
Along with its rapid growth, the Internet and related technologies are being structured to 
facilitate the ongoing development of mostly commercial interests to the detriment of 
their democratic potentials. As such, existing disparities in access to wealth, force, and 
knowledge, for the most part, most probably will be entrenched rather than challenged. 
Through the Internet and related media, the practices and thoughts of more people in 
more parts of the world are quite possibly becoming increasingly focused on immediate 
concerns and individual needs in relation to the long-term and collective. Rather than a 
condition of the structural power of capitalism directly, this may be a by-product of the 
related speed-up of everyday life. In its moment-to-moment use, the Internet, for exam-
ple, links many in relations directly or indirectly stimulated by the systemic demand for 
efficiency. For many others, it links people in innumerable and instantaneous virtual 
communities. Either way, the relative intimacy of many noncommercial and face-to-face 
relationships tends to be pushed to the periphery of the human experience. As 
communication theorist Heather Menzies suggests,
For all the contemporary talk about a postmodern information society ... a real test 
of change is whether the social movements using the Internet ... serve the bias of 
time-not just at the innovation stage and at the end-user level of inter- textual 
rhetoric, but at the stage of institutionalized technological development and the 
enabling infrastructures associated with it, not just at the level of language games, 
but at the material level of structures that determine who gets to speak about what 
and who referees and designs the game plan. (Menzies, 2000:324)
The time needed to individually and collectively reflect and critically assess
the undesirable implications of globalization "from above" is being reduced, not
enhanced. In the context of competitive capitalism, and through the technology-
facilitated annihilation of time and space in daily life, the demand to make
instantaneous decisions and the mounting discontinuities of experience and 
consciousness from one moment to the next make the construction of transnational, 
progressive, and monumentalizing perspectives capable of radically reforming lifestyles 
and conceptual systems improbable in the coming decades.
Conclusions
The optimism conveyed by many GCS progressives is premature. The reformation of 
conceptual systems through, for example, a sustained and collective demand for 
ecology-friendly policy reforms is unlikely to take place on a truly global scale. Beyond 
ahistorical questions of state versus nonstate sovereignty and authority, the kind of 
pervasive and ingrained lifestyle changes and sub- sequent conceptual system 
modifications required (in which, for instance, the word and object "automobile" would 
become associated with "waste" rather than "success") is limited under foreseeable 
political-economic conditions.
This is not to say that the progressive sentiments of many people in disparate
parts of the world will not continue to boil up and, through the Internet and
other transnational media, express themselves in occasional uprisings. Globaliza-
tion activities, particularly those involving corporate-based interests in direct
opposition to popular local or national demands, appear to be stimulating sig-
nificant but, on the whole, fragmented or temporally limited movements. While
many GCS progressives recognize the role of culture and local experience in
shaping one's capacity to think and act holistically, creatively, and perhaps even
progressively, the GCS literature generally tends to overestimate our collective
capacity to be re-socialized directly through communications and ideas, the
power of individuals and groups to overcome the structural conditions of their
lives, and the importance of spatial integration despite the related dismantling of time.
The construction of global networks, despite their structural affinity for consumerism and 
individualism, may, of course, spark further resistance activities as the effects of 
globalization "from above" are experienced. But still, a shared awareness of these 
conditions is not by itself the precondition to globalization "from below." The main 
reason for this, as discussed previously, involves the kinds of conceptual systems most 
likely to be promoted through the everyday use of instantaneous transnational 
communications technologies. Such conceptual systems most probably will be shaped 
by the general impoverishment of shared memories, sustained attention, and reflexive 
(rather than reactionary) modes of mass activism. In this context, the application or 
even lifestyle appropriation of new technologies by social movements and others may 
well serve to facilitate the exchange of data and the spatial coordination of activities, 
but, paradoxically, they also may weaken the reflexive capabilities of collectivities, 
inspiring rapid mobilization but leaving little time for critical reflection.
Contemporary structures of economic disparity generally do not stimulate
sustained and organized forms of resistance against environmental degradation, human 
rights abuses, and other apparently universal concerns. The conceptual systems being 
used by those seeking a globalization either "from above" or "from below" generally 
remain focused on how best to generate or distribute wealth. What Stephen Gill calls an 
emerging "market civilization" (Gill, 1995) directly involves the predominance of 
culturally embedded capitalist relations in a broad range of technologies, organizations, 
and sociological institutions. A related rea- son to doubt the optimism of GCS 
progressives on environmental issues involves the successful promulgation of 
ecologically unfriendly consumerist lifestyles. Indeed, it is a global consumerist society 
rather than an environmentally sensitive global civil society that continues to be most 
decisive in changing lifestyles among the world's varied populations (United Nations 
Development Programme, 1998).
Movements and protests against the thinking that underlies contemporary status quo 
economic policies-as in Seattle in 1999-for the most part constitute
a continuum of ongoing but generally fragmented resistance efforts. To read such 
activities as more than this both ignores the arguments made in this paper and, I 
believe, grossly underestimates the relative capacities held (and being aggressively 
developed through communications technologies) by pro-growth, pro- consumption 
interests to widen and deepen structurally established conceptual biases. Transnational 
communications may well have a significant influence on lifestyles, but precisely what 
these changes will be and how they will in turn affect conceptual systems involves yet 
another level of thoughtful analysis-a level thus far generally underdeveloped in the 
work of most GCS progressives.
In sum, not only do GCS progressives lack the kind of evidence needed to substantiate 
their extraordinary claims, in the context of the theoretical and empirical arguments 
made in this paper it is remarkable that the concept itself has not been challenged more 
widely and concertedly. But, of course, as Leo Panitch reminds us, "the rise and fall of 
theories is not merely the product of intellectual competition with the most fruitful coming 
out on top" (Panitch, 1997:4). Instead, for a conceptual approach to be "in fashion" it 
requires little more than some kind of consensus among more established or influential 
intellectuals. Our contemporary interest in GCS is not simply a reflection of some kind of 
obvious or irreversible empirical "trend"; rather, its cache is more comprehensible in 
light of recent intellectual developments.
Not only have we seen a decline of analyses that take complex capitalist- related 
dynamics seriously (ironically, at the very time that capitalism is more globally pervasive 
than ever before), we also have witnessed the emergence of an academic and policy 
culture that has adopted categories popularized by the New Right. States, commonly 
now, are assumed to stand as impediments to markets and the public sector is 
simplistically contrasted with the private (Panitch, 1997:6). In light of this way of 
thinking, it is not surprising that an intellectual construct like GCS has found a place in 
the Academy. Related to the ascendancy of neoliberalism is the general distancing of 
influential intellectuals from working class or peasant-based movements and, instead, 
their closer affiliations with more particular interests, social movements, and NGOs. 
Conceptualizations of "significant problems" among progressives possibly reflect these 
emerging connections and these, in turn, may well reinforce the present lacunae 
regarding the historical relationship of our complex and historically entrenched system 
of production and reproduction with state-civil society formations.
From this gloomy analysis, GCS progressives would do well to assess the role of 
communications technologies in terms of their strategic usefulness as organizational 
tools without conflating them with grand re-socialization potentials. Historically, 
progressive political movements often have been inspired and informed by international 
events and contacts. At best, GCS progressives should continue to promote 
transnational movements as supplements to national or local movements where state 
powers remain crucial, where people in fact live their lives, and where political 
mobilization is relatively affective.
Lifestyles are changing as a result of transnational communication, travel, and trade. 
Much of the resulting cultural hybridization, however, propels forward the relative and 
often implicitly resisted ascendancy of commercial interests and consumerist 
orientations, rather than deepening democratic institutions and sustained dialogues. 
The antidote to such developments surely involves a concerted effort-paradoxically 
involving the Internet and other such technologies-to organize nationally and locally to 
provide tangible alternatives for those seeking relief from economic globalization, its 
commercial pressures, and the re-balancing of space and time toward the latter. The 
utilitarian aspects of communications technologies and our knowledge of the role and 
importance of conceptual systems can directly inform these efforts. The ideals 
expressed in the work of GCS theorists such as Falk, Lipschutz, and Shaw remain 
vaguely imaginable. The task at hand, however, is complex and politically daunting, and 
the role of communication is less than straightforward.
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